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Abstract
Given the recent experience, there is growing interest in the liquidity trap; which
occurs when the nominal interest rate reaches its zero lower bound. Using the Dixit-
Lambertini (2003) framework of strategic policy interaction between the Treasury
and the Central Bank, we ￿nd that the optimal institutional response to the possi-
bility of a liquidity trap has two main components. First, an optimal in￿ ation target
is given to the Central Bank. Second, the Treasury, who retains control over ￿s-
cal policy and acts as a Stackelberg leader, is given optimal output and in￿ ation
targets. This solution achieves the optimal rational expectations pre-commitment
solution. This result holds true for a range of speci￿cations about the Treasury￿ s
behavior. However, when there is the possibility of a liquidity trap, if monetary
policy is delegated to an independent central bank with an optimal in￿ ation target,
but the Treasury retains discretion over ￿scal policy, then the outcome can be a very
poor one.
Keywords: liquidity trap, strategic monetary-￿scal interaction, optimal Taylor
rules.
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Keynes (1936) coined the term ￿ liquidity trap￿to refer to a situation where the nominal
interest rate has been driven down to its ￿ zero lower bound￿ . The source of a liquidity
trap, in most circumstances, is a sharp fall in aggregate demand; see Keynes (1936),
Bernanke (2002). Hence, de￿ ation typically accompanies a liquidity trap. In a liquidity
trap, traditional monetary policy loses its e⁄ectiveness because nominal interest rates can
be reduced no further in order to boost the interest sensitive components of aggregate
demand. Hence, reliance must be placed on other, possibly more expensive, policies.
Keynes (1936), in the ￿rst policy prescription for a liquidity trap, suggested the use of
￿scal policy, which works through the multiplier e⁄ect to boost output and employment.
The Japanese experience since 1990 has revived great interest in the liquidity trap.
Woodford (2005, p.29) discusses the near miss of the US economy from a liquidity trap in
the summer of 2003. Recent policy discussions on either side of the Atlantic have expressed
concerns about the nominal interest rate hitting the zero lower bound.1
1.1. The critical role of in￿ ation expectations in a liquidity trap
The recent literature has largely focussed on the role of in￿ ation expectations in a liquidity
trap. The real interest rate, r, is given by r = i￿￿e, where i is the nominal interest rate and
￿e is expected in￿ ation. In a liquidity trap, by de￿nition, i = 0, and due to de￿ ationary
expectations, typically ￿e < 0, hence, r > 0. To expand economic activity, the government
needs to lower r.
One possible solution, suggested by Krugman (1998, 1999), is to generate positive
in￿ ationary expectations, ￿e > 0, so that the real interest rate r < 0. This, in turn,
creates a need for a credible commitment to the future level of actual in￿ ation because
after the economy has escaped from the liquidity trap it is in the interest of all parties
to reduce in￿ ation. A forward looking private sector will anticipate this and expect low
future in￿ ation. But then the real interest rate remains high, keeping the economy in
a liquidity trap. The era of low in￿ ation targets exacerbates the problem, because such
targets lead to low values of ￿e and, so, the real interest cannot be reduced low enough to
1In an article on Bloomberg.com on 6 July 2009, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco President,
Janet Yellen, is reported to have told reporters after a speech in San Francisco: ￿We have a very serious
recession, we have a 9.4 percent unemployment rate... Given the recession￿ s severity, we should want to do
more. If we were not at zero, we would be lowering the funds rate.￿The Economist wrote on November
13, 2008 that: ￿ Remember Japan￿ s zero interest rates? America is almost there too. Since October 29th,
...the ￿e⁄ective rate￿ , has averaged around 0.25%...￿The Telegraph, a national daily in Britain reported
in January 2009 that the interest rate has been cut to it￿ s lowest level in the last 300 years to 1.5% and
went on to say that: ￿Further cuts are expected in the next few months and the base rate may be reduced
to zero this year.￿
1boost recovery in a liquidity trap.2
1.2. Some proposed solutions to a liquidity trap
The literature on the liquidity trap has considered a range of solutions, e.g., exchange
rate policies such as currency depreciation, integral stabilization, a carry tax on currency,
open market operations in long term bonds, price level targets, and money growth rate
pegs. The surveys in Blinder (2000) and Svensson (2003) consider these policies in detail.
However, these policies have important limitations3￿ 4. Eggertsson (2006a,b) recommends
abandonment of an independent central bank and a return to discretionary policy by a
unitary monetary-￿scal authority. A debt ￿nanced ￿scal expansion during a liquidity trap
results, via the government budget constraint, in higher expectations of future in￿ ation.
Eggertsson shows that this solution is superior to either monetary policy alone or uncoor-
dinated monetary and ￿scal policy. However, as Eggertsson shows, even optimal discretion
is inferior to the fully optimal rational expectations solution with commitment. Moreover,
abandoning delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank with a narrow
mandate, in favor of a return to discretion, appears to be a retrograde step.5
1.3. Stylized facts
Based on several recent works on the Japanese experience6, we outline the following three
stylized facts, S1-S3.
2Blanchard et al. (2010) propose an in￿ ation target of 4 percent in order to provide greater manoeu-
vrability of the nominal interest rate instrument. Our paper provides one framework within which to
evaluate this proposal.
3Variants of the devaluation approach can be found in McCallum (2000) and Svensson (2003). There are
several potential problems with the devaluation option. First, calibrated models show that the magnitude
of the devaluation required to get out of the liquidity trap might be too high. Second, using the uncovered
interest rate parity condition, when the domestic interest rate is zero, the expected appreciation of the home
currency is fully locked-in by the foreign interest rate. Third, current devaluation will generate expectations
of future appreciation of currency when the economy moves out of the liquidity trap, generating counter
￿ ows that frustrate attempts to devalue. Fourth, devaluations may bring about competitive devaluations
or retaliations in the form of other barriers to trade.
4In a liquidity trap, zero nominal interest rates make bonds and money perfect substitutes. Hence, it
might be di¢ cult to engineer a price level increase. Furthermore, increases in money supply, suggested,
for instance, in Clouse et al. (2003) and in Orphanides and Wieland (2000), for a long enough period
that exceeds the duration of the liquidity trap, creates problems of credibility. While short term interest
rates might be zero, long term interest rates might be strictly positive (this has been true of Japan during
its de￿ ationary experience). Hence, several authors such as Bernanke (2002) and Auerbach and Obstfeld
(2005) have suggested open market operations in long term bonds. However, moving the long run yield
curve on securities is confounded by the presence of the risk premium term whose behavior in a liquidity
trap is not well known. A carry tax on money, suggested by Buiter and Panigirtzoglu (2003), works in
theory but substantial practical problems of implementation are likely.
5Central bank independence has other bene￿ts. For example, it shields monetary policy from political
interference and allows the delegation of policy to the most competent experts etc.
6See, for instance, Posen (1998), Kuttner and Posen (2001), Iwamura et al. (2005) and Ball (2005).
2S1. (Potency of ￿scal policy) Fiscal policy is potent in a liquidity trap. Whenever the net
￿scal stance was expansionary, it worked well and the de￿cit spending multipliers
were signi￿cant, and large. However, the net ￿scal stance was typically contrac-
tionary or neutral.7
S2. (Role of institutional design) The response to a liquidity trap is inadequate if the
Treasury or the Central Banks are not given appropriate targets. There were no
explicit in￿ ation or output targets given to either the Treasury or to the Central
Bank. So, the ￿scal stance was typically contractionary, or neutral, and the monetary
policy reaction was too little, too late.
S3. (Coordination between Treasury and Central Bank) Lack of coordination between
the Treasury and the Central Bank hampers policy response in a liquidity trap. The
Treasury and the Central Bank may disagree about an appropriate response and also
di⁄er about their respective spheres of responsibility, if not well de￿ned. They might
end up taking policy actions that are counter to each other or cancel each other out
and so, on net, are not expansionary.8
1.4. Modelling choices
In this paper we shall make two modelling choices, which we call M1 and M2.
M1. We shall take an ex ante perspective in this paper. Models with an ex ante per-
spective recognize the possibility of a liquidity trap in the future and spell out the
optimal design of institutions in order to reduce or eliminate the consequences aris-
ing from a liquidity trap. By contrast, models with an ex post perspective propose
policy solutions, conditional on an economy having already slipped into a liquidity
trap.9
M2. In this paper we are interested in optimal policies and their robustness. In Economics,
the optimal policy must balance the marginal cost of removal of the economic bads
against the marginal bene￿ts. In the context of a liquidity trap, the optimal policy
recommendation might, therefore, turn out to be one that lets the economy fall
7See, for instance, Posen (1998), Kuttner and Posen (2001) and Eggertsson (2006b).
8See, for instance, the empirical evidence in Iwamura et al. (2005) and Eggertsson (2006b).
9Papers that take an ex ante perspective include Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003),
Benhabib et al. (2002), Shin-Ichi (2003), Clouse et al. (2003), Buiter- Panigirtzoglou (2003). Papers
that take an ex post perspective include Ball (2005) and Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005). Finally there
are papers that touch on both ex ante and ex post issues, for instance, Orphanides and Wieland (2000),
McCallum (2000), Bernanke (2002), Svensson (2003).
3into a liquidity trap with some probability rather than completely eliminating the
possibility of a liquidity trap.10
1.5. Our approach to modeling a liquidity trap
Our model of a liquidity trap takes explicit account of all the three stylized facts, S1, S2
and S3. Our perspective is ex ante (M1). We seek to derive the optimal strategy and
study its stability (M2). We consider strategic interaction between monetary and ￿scal
authorities in a simple aggregate supply-aggregate demand model similar to the one in
Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) but extended to allow for
a liquidity trap and the e⁄ect of in￿ ationary expectations in the aggregate supply curve.
Issues of strategic policy interaction between monetary and ￿scal authorities are com-
pletely ignored by the theoretical work on the liquidity trap. Typically, the only policy
considered is monetary policy and so issues of strategic interaction do not arise11. On the
other hand, when several policies are simultaneously considered, their strategic interaction
is not allowed for.12
1.6. Some results and intuition
As pointed out above, Krugman identi￿ed the solution to a liquidity trap as creating high
enough in￿ ationary expectations. However, under discretion, promises of high in￿ ation
will not be believed. This is because, outside a liquidity trap, the correct value for the real
interest rate can be achieved more cheaply with zero in￿ ation. Therefore, if the economy
turns out not to be liquidity trapped, the Treasury has an incentive to renege on its promise
of high in￿ ation. A rational forward looking private sector will anticipate this. The result
is low in￿ ation expectations, keeping the real interest rate too high in a liquidity trap.
Notice that unlike the standard analysis conducted in the absence of a liquidity trap, the
discretionary outcome can be suboptimal relative to the precommitment outcome because
it creates too little in￿ ation (Eggertsson (2006a,b) calls this the de￿ ation bias).
We suggest an institutional solution, the optimal delegation regime, that achieves the
optimal rational expectations precommitment solution for all parameter values in our
10A dental analogy might be appropriate here. Tooth decay can be prevented by extracting all the
child￿ s teeth. But, normally, the optimal policy is not to extract; tooth decay then occurs with some
probability.
11Examples are Krugman (1998), Eggerston and Woodford (2003), Nishiyama (2003), Clouse et al.
(2003), Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003), and Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005). Ball (2005) considers ￿scal
policy alone.
12Examples include (i) monetary and ￿scal policy in Benhabib et al. (2002), Iwamura et al. (2005),
and (ii) monetary and exchange rate policy in Orphanides and Wieland (2000), McCallum (2000) and
Svensson (2003). Bernanke (2002) considers both monetary and ￿scal policy but there is no theoretical
analysis.
4model. This regime has three components. First, the Treasury acts as the Stackelberg
leader and the Central Bank as the follower. Second, an in￿ ation target, ￿￿
B, is given
to the Central Bank who has exclusive control over monetary policy. Outside a liquidity
trap, where monetary policy is e⁄ective, the Treasury would rather not use the relatively
more costly ￿scal stabilization policy, leaving the Central Bank to perform the stabilization
function. Because the Central Bank is operationally independent and its sole objective
is achieving monetary stability, this type of delegation provides a commitment to the
necessary in￿ ation level, ￿￿
B, when the economy is not in a liquidity trap. Our third
component is to give the Treasury, who retains control of ￿scal policy, something like a
Taylor rule, which penalizes deviations of output from an output target, y￿
T, and in￿ ation
from an optimal in￿ ation target, ￿￿
T (we show that ￿￿
T can always be taken to be equal
to ￿￿
B). This gives the Treasury the correct incentive to undertake the appropriate (but
costly) ￿scal stimulus in a liquidity trap. Consequently, in￿ ation expectations are at the
right level to produce the correct value for the real interest rate in a liquidity trap.
For a variety of reasons, e.g., electoral concerns, the output target of the Treasury, yT,
could di⁄er from the optimal target, y￿
T. In this case, we ￿nd that even if the Treasury￿ s
output target, yT, is substantially di⁄erent from the optimal output target, y￿
T, this sub-
optimal delegation regime achieves close to the optimal solution and is much better than
discretion.
While it may appear reasonable to assign an in￿ ation target, ￿￿
B, to the Central Bank,
it may be asked why should the Treasury have an in￿ ation target, ￿￿
T, as well as an output
target, y￿
T? To address this issue, we de￿ne two further regimes: the output nutter regime,
where the Treasury has an output target but not an in￿ ation target; and the reckless output
nutter regime where the Treasury has an output target but does not have an in￿ ation target
and, furthermore, does not care about the cost of ￿scal policy. It turns out that so long as
the Treasury follows the optimal output target, y￿
T, then delegation achieves the optimal
solution even in the regimes of the output nutter and the reckless output nutter.
However, in the output nutter and the reckless output nutter regimes, the delegation
regime is not robust in the following sense. If the output target of the Treasury, yT, is
di⁄erent from the optimal output target, y￿
T, then performance is poor and can be much
worse than under discretion. Hence, giving the Treasury an in￿ ation target (as well as an
output target), while not essential for optimality, adds to the robustness of the policy. In
particular the hybrid regime where monetary policy is delegated to an independent central
bank with an optimal in￿ ation target, while the Treasury retains discretion over ￿scal
policy, can perform badly and much worse than had the Treasury retained discretion over
both monetary and ￿scal policy.
Furthermore, the optimal delegation regime achieves the optimal mix between monetary
and ￿scal policy as we now explain. Theoretically, society could give a su¢ ciently high
5in￿ ation target to the Central Bank which in turn generates su¢ ciently high in￿ ation
expectations so that the nominal interest rate never hits its zero ￿ oor. While this policy
would always avoid the liquidity trap (see modelling assumption M2 above), it is not
optimal because in￿ ation is costly. Analogously it is not optimal to give the Treasury too
high an output target because if a liquidity trap occurs, it would use the costly ￿scal policy
excessively. The optimal solution then is to have a mix of both i.e. some in￿ ation outside
a liquidity trap and some dependence on costly ￿scal policy in a liquidity trap.
The ￿rst best is achieved if one could remove the distortions that cause the liquidity
trap. The second best obtains with the optimal rational expectations commitment solution.
The third best is achieved with various institutional design features introduced into policy
making. The fourth best obtains under discretion. It is well known that, in the absence
of a liquidity trap, ￿ optimal institution design￿ , such as Walsh contracts, can achieve the
second best. Our suggested institutional design achieves the second best in the presence
of a liquidity trap.
1.7. Relation to Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2011)
Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2011), henceforth DaN, also propose a model of a liquidity trap
along the lines that are mentioned above. In this paper we extend their model along the
following lines.
E1. Here, we introduce the full set of parameter values. By contrast, DaN assign the
value one to all parameters. The advantage of that special choice of parameter values
is that all the details of all the proofs can be exhibited. Unfortunately, this is no
more the case when the full set of parameter values is introduced, as is done here.
While we can still explicitly state the assumptions and the conclusions, the details
of the proofs can no longer be printed. The reason is that many of the algebraic
expressions are more than one page in length each! However, the logic of the proofs
here is the same as in DaN. All proofs require only elementary (though tedious)
algebraic calculations. All our claims can be independently checked by a reader
wishing to reconstruct the intermediate steps of the calculations or willing to use the
￿ check equality￿command of a scienti￿c word processor.
E2. Here, we allow for persistence in demand shocks. By contrast, in DaN the demand
shocks are uncorrelated over time.
E3. Here, we allow for general probability distribution over the two states of the world.
By contrast, in DaN the demand shocks in any period take two possible values, 1
and ￿1 with equal probability.
6E4. Here, we show that if the Treasury follows its own private output target, yT, rather
than the optimal output target, y￿
T, then the resulting ￿ suboptimal delegation regime￿
is, nevertheless, close to the ￿ optimal delegation regime￿and is much better than
discretion. This analysis is absent in DaN.
E5. Here, we show that giving the Treasury an in￿ ation target (as well as an output
target), while not essential for optimality, adds to the robustness of the policy. In
particular the hybrid regime where monetary policy is delegated to an independent
central bank with an optimal in￿ ation target, while the Treasury retains discretion
over ￿scal policy, can perform badly and much worse than had the Treasury retained
discretion over both monetary and ￿scal policy. This analysis is absent in DaN.
1.8. Schematic outline
The model is formulated in Section 2. Section 3 derives the optimal rational expectations
precommitment solution which we would like to implement, using appropriate institutional
design. We also brie￿ y comment, in this section, on the discretionary solution. Section
5 derives the optimal delegation solution under a large variety of behavioral assumptions
about the Treasury. For instance, the Treasury might or might not internalize society￿ s
preferences; the Treasury might or might not care about in￿ ation or it￿ s costs; the Treasury
might or might not be given an in￿ ation target etc. Section 6 concludes with a brief
summary.
Proofs can be found in the working paper version of this paper, Dhami and al-Nowaihi
(2007). There are two reasons, why we do not report the proofs here. First, the proofs
are standard, and straightforward; easily at the level of graduate level problem sets in
economics. Second, the expressions in the proofs are extremely long (some going well over
a page), despite the fact that the ￿nal results are manageable and intuitive.
2. Model
2.1. Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply
We use an aggregate demand and supply framework that is similar to Ball (2005), Dixit
and Lambertini (2003) and Lambertini and Rovelli (2003). The aggregate demand and
aggregate supply equations are given by, respectively,
Aggregate Demand: y = ’f ￿ ￿(i ￿ ￿
e) + ", (2.1)
Aggregate Supply: y = ￿(￿ ￿ ￿
e). (2.2)
7where y is the deviation of output from the natural rate and f captures ￿scal policy13.
For example, f > 0 could denote a ￿scal de￿cit (either debt ￿nanced or money ￿nanced14)
while f < 0, a ￿scal surplus. But f could also denote a temporary balanced budget
reallocation of taxes and subsidies that has a net expansionary e⁄ect; for instance Dixit
and Lambertini (2000). i ￿ 0 is the nominal interest rate, ￿ is the rate of in￿ ation, ￿e
is expected in￿ ation15 and, in keeping with the modern literature on the liquidity trap, "
is a demand shock16. The instruments of policy are the nominal interest rate, i, and, the
stabilization component of ￿scal policy, f.
The parameters ’, ￿, ￿ are all strictly positive. ’ and ￿ are a measure of the e⁄ec-
tiveness of ￿scal and monetary policy, respectively, in in￿ uencing aggregate demand and
￿ indicates the degree of in￿ uence of in￿ ation surprises on aggregate supply.
The aggregate demand equation re￿ ects the fact that demand is increasing in the ￿scal
impulse, f, and decreasing in the real interest rate; it is also a⁄ected by demand shocks.
The aggregate supply equation shows that deviations of output from the natural rate are
caused by unexpected movements in the rate of in￿ ation.
Equating aggregate demand and supply we get from (2.1) and (2.2), our reduced form
equations for output and in￿ ation.
y = ’f ￿ ￿(i ￿ ￿




[’f ￿ ￿i + ￿
e (￿ + ￿) + "]. (2.4)
Hence, ￿scal policy, monetary policy and in￿ ation expectations (in the spirit of New Key-
nesian models) have an a⁄ect on output (and so also on unemployment) and in￿ ation.
2.2. Speci￿cation of the demand shocks
The state contingent values of the demand shock, ", are:
Bad State: "￿ = ￿x ￿ (1 ￿ p)s (with probability p), (2.5)
13To be more precise, f is the stabilization component of ￿scal policy (which varies over the business
cycle). Total ￿scal policy can be represented by F = f0 + f, where f0 is ￿xed.
14In principal, these alternative modes of ￿nance need not be equivalent. However, in the context of
a liquidity trap, Ball (2005) shows that there are no long run di⁄erences arising from these alternative
modes of ￿nance.
15The following formulation might appear even more plausible






AS : yt = ￿(￿t ￿ ￿e
t)
where ￿e
t = Et￿1￿t and ￿e
t+1 = Et￿t+1. However, in our model, the private sector has to make its decision
before the realization of the demand shock ￿t. Hence, in the aggregate demand curve, it has to forecast
￿e
t+1 at time t ￿ 1. But Et￿1￿e
t+1 = Et￿1 (Et￿t+1) = Et￿1 (￿t+1) = Et￿1 (￿t) = ￿e
t. While this is true in
our model, it is not true more generally.
16Our framework can be easily extended to incorporate supply, as well as demand, shocks.
8Good State: "+ = ￿x + ps (with probability 1 ￿ p). (2.6)
where 0 < p < 1, s > 0 and 0 ￿ ￿ < 1. The variable x represents the previous period￿ s
shock and so ￿ is a measure of the persistence in the shock. The second component in
(2.5), (2.6) shows the innovation terms. With probability p the shock takes the value "￿
and with probability 1￿p it takes a value "+. Hence E ["] = p￿￿ +(1￿p)"+ = ￿x and so
in the absence of the persistence term, E ["] = 0.17
In more standard but less convenient notation, xt = ￿xt￿1 + zt, where zt = ￿(1 ￿ p)s
with probability p and zt = ps with probability 1 ￿ p.
Special Case: We shall also ￿nd it useful in one of the subsequent sections to consider a
special case of the distribution of shocks in which ￿ = 0, p = 1=2, s = 2a, where a is
a real number. In this case, " takes the two equally likely values, ￿a and a.
2.3. Microfoundations
Our model is inspired by the microfounded dynamic model of monopolistic competition
and staggered price setting in Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2003). Our structural model
in (2.1),(2.2) is similar to the Dixit and Lambertini model18. In the Dixit and Lamber-
tini framework, unexpected movements in in￿ ation have real e⁄ects because prices are
staggered. Alternatively, a range of ￿ rational inattention￿theories currently compete as
potential explanations for the presence of the unexpected in￿ ation term in (2.2). For
instance, see Sims (2003).19
To simplify the dynamic game-theoretic analysis Dixit-Lambertini follow the tradition,
established in the time-inconsistency literature20, of abstracting from structural dynamic
issues, notably, capital formation, the term structure of interest rates, exchange rate pol-
icy and the ￿nancing of the stabilization component of ￿scal policy. Concentrating on
17Thus, if an economy is close to a liquidity trap, a negative shock can push the economy into it. Because
of persistence, it may take the economy several periods to get out of the liquidity trap.
18However, our model has the following di⁄erences from the Dixit-Lambertini model. (1) We normalize
the natural rate of output to zero, hence, the additive shock ￿ (in (2.1) or in (2.3)) can also be interpreted
as a shock to the natural rate of output. (2) Our model has the New Keynesian feature that expected
in￿ ation, ￿e, also a⁄ects actual in￿ ation, ￿. (3) Our stochastic structure allows persistence. While there
is no persistence in Dixit-Lambertini, they allow all parameters to be stochastic, hence, considering the
possibility of non-additive shocks. (4) In our model a ￿scal impulse acts on the demand side, creating
greater output and in￿ ation. However, in Dixit-Lambertini ￿scal policy works on the supply side and
takes the form of a subsidy to imperfectly competitive ￿rms that increases output but reduces prices.
19Most dynamic structural models used in the analysis of a liquidity trap are forward looking New
Keynesian models. Gertler (2003), Mankiw (2002) note dissatisfaction with this model in terms of its
inability to explain persistence in the data. Recent work, for instance, Rudd and Whelan (2006), casts
doubt even on the hybrid variant proposed by Gali and Gertler (1999). Of course, similar criticisms apply
to the version of our model microfounded along the lines of Dixit and Lambertini (2003). Thus, it would
not be unfair to say, all current macroeconomic models lack satisfactory microfoundations.
20See, for example, Romer (2006, chapter 10) and Walsh (2003, chapter 8).
9the aggregate demand consequences of investment expenditure, but abstracting from its
contribution to growth, is standard in models of the business cycle, and is a feature of all
the models of the liquidity trap (as far as we know).
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), in a structurally dynamic model of monetary policy
with a ￿nancial sector and a zero lower bound on interest rates, show that the short-run
interest rate (which is the instrument of policy) determines all other interest rates and
exchange rates. As they clearly explain, open market operations only work to the extent
that they enhance the credibility of policy. Thus, and in common with many models, we
take the short-run interest rate as directly a⁄ecting aggregate demand and we abstract
from open economy aspects.
We o⁄er three arguments that mitigate not explicitly modelling the government budget
constraint in the Dixit and Lambertini type models. First, we shall assign a higher welfare
loss to the use of ￿scal policy relative to monetary policy. The cost of using ￿scal policy
could include deadweight losses, costs of servicing debt and a risk premium for default.
Second, in all equilibria of our model, ￿scal policy is not used for stabilization purposes
outside a liquidity trap. In a calibrated model of Japan, Ball (2005) shows that the
combination of higher output, higher tax revenues and higher in￿ ation outside the liquidity
trap is more than adequate to ￿nance the extra ￿scal spending during the liquidity trap.
Third, the liquidity trap is an extremely unusual situation with huge welfare costs in terms
of loss of output, unemployment and social unrest. There is not ex-ante guarantee that
the government will respect it￿ s budget constraint, or debt obligations, in this event.
2.4. Social Preferences














where ￿;￿;￿ are positive. The ￿rst term in (2.7) indicates that in￿ ation reduces social
welfare. The second term shows that departures of output from its desired level, y (note
that y is the di⁄erence between desired output and the natural rate), are costly. We assume
that
y ￿ 0, (2.8)
which captures the fact that the natural level of output is socially suboptimal (unless
y = 0)21. The third term captures the fact that the exercise of ￿scal policy is more costly
21The microfoundations for this in Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2003) rest on the presence of monopolistic
competition. Monopoly power in the product market reduces output below the e¢ cient level, hence, giving
policy makers an incentive to raise output. There are also a large number of other well known reasons for
(2.8) but the ultimate cause, argue Alesina and Tabellini (1987), is the absence of nondiscretionary taxes.
For if they were available then other market failures could be corrected.
10than that of monetary policy22. We model this as imposing a strictly positive cost of ￿scal
policy, 1
2￿f2, but no cost of using the monetary policy23. The cost of using ￿scal policy
could include deadweight losses, as in Dixit and Lambertini (2003), costs of servicing debt
and a risk premium for default.
From (2.7) we see that the ￿rst best obtains when ￿ = 0, f = 0, and y = y. However,
from (2.1) and (2.2), it follows that this cannot be an outcome of a rational expectations
equilibrium (unless y = 0). On the microfoundations of such a social welfare function, see
Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2003), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
2.5. Preferences of the Central Bank
The monetary instrument, which is the nominal interest rate, i, is assigned to the Central
Bank whose objective is to attain the in￿ ation target, ￿B, given to it by society. We






The optimal value of ￿B will be denoted by ￿￿
B.
2.6. Preferences of the Treasury
The ￿scal instrument, f, is controlled by the Treasury. Many possible behavioral assump-
tions can be made about the Treasury. We check the model￿ s robustness with respect to
a range of such alternative assumptions.
2.6.1. Baseline Preferences of the Treasury
The baseline objective function of the Treasury is similar to that of society (2.7) but with,














where yT, ￿T are the output and in￿ ation targets respectively of the Treasury. It is
important to bear in mind the di⁄erence between the socially desirable output level, y,
and the Treasury￿ s own output target, yT. The optimal targets assigned by society to the
Treasury are y￿
T, ￿￿
T and, in the baseline model, the Treasury complies with these targets,
22Fiscal policy is typically more cumbersome to alter, on account of the cost of changing it (balanced
budget requirements, lobby groups etc.). Indeed the ￿ monetary policy committee￿in the UK or the Fed
in the USA meet on a regular basis to make decisions on the interest rate while changes to the tax rates
are much less frequent.
23Strictly speaking, for our qualitative results to hold, we only require that ￿scal policy be relatively
more expensive than the (possibly strictly positive) cost of using monetary policy. Normalizing the cost
of using monetary policy to zero, however, ensures greater tractability and transparency of the results.
11hence, sets yT = y￿
T and ￿T = ￿￿
T. Our model allows ￿￿
T 6= ￿￿
B, however, we shall see that
￿￿
T = ￿￿
B is always feasible (and, of course, natural).
Giving the Treasury an output and an in￿ ation target such that the Treasury feels
penalized when either output or in￿ ation depart from these targets is a form of Taylor￿ s
rule. We check to see if such a Taylor rule is optimal, in the sense that it helps achieve
the rational precommitment solution. Some might object to the assignment of an in￿ ation
target to the Treasury. To address these issues, we consider the next two alternative
speci￿cations.
2.6.2. The Treasury as an ￿output nutter￿
If the Treasury is not given an in￿ ation target, we call it an output nutter. It continues
to adopt the output target, y￿










2.6.3. The Treasury as a ￿reckless output nutter￿
If the Treasury cares neither about in￿ ation nor the costs of ￿scal policy we call it a reckless
output nutter. However, it immediately adopts the output target, y￿
T, assigned to it by






2.6.4. The Treasury follows it￿ s own agenda (suboptimal delegation)
In this case, the preferences of the Treasury can be represented by any of the three cases
above (subsections 2.6.1 - 2.6.3, above), with one important di⁄erence. The Treasury
refuses to follow the optimal output target, y￿
T, assigned to it by society. It chooses,
instead, to follow it￿ s own agenda, re￿ ected in it￿ s private output target, yT.24
2.7. Notation
We shall write a policy variable with a subscript ￿ +￿in the good state, " = "+. For
example, i+;f+, denote the interest rate and the ￿scal policy when " = "+. Analogously,
to denote the realization of the same variable in the state of the world when " = "￿, we
use a subscript ￿ ￿￿ , for example, i￿;f￿.
24The Treasury is just an arm of the government. The literature on political economy often highlights the
case yT 6= y￿
T. For instance, before an election, the government might engage in opportunistic expansion.
122.8. Sequence of Moves
At the ￿rst stage, the economy designs its institutions, which assign powers of policy-
making decisions to one or two independent policy makers. This is followed by the for-
mation of in￿ ationary expectations, ￿e, and the signing of nominal wage contracts in
anticipation of future in￿ ation. Next, the demand shock, ", is realized. In light of the
actual realization of the shock, the relevant policy makers (who were chosen in the ￿rst
stage) then decide on the optimal values of the policy variables, f and i. We shall also
derive the optimal rational expectations solution (precommitment benchmark) in which
the last stage is conducted up-front i.e. the (state contingent) policy variables f and i are
announced to the economy prior to the resolution of demand uncertainty.
3. The Precommitment Solution
We begin by describing the Precommitment solution or the globally optimal solution in
the class of all rational expectations solutions25. Since our aim is to propose an optimal
delegation scheme for the Central Bank and the Treasury that achieves the Precommit-
ment solution, our interest in the Discretionary solution is only tangential. We will only
use some results from the Discretionary solution in the last section, section 5.3. Hence, we
largely focus on the Precommitment solution. The sequence of moves is described below.
Treasury sets state
contingent policy







Figure 3.1: Sequence of moves for the precommitment regime
The proofs are long and cumbersome (some expressions are several pages long), but
conceptually very straightforward, so we omit them. The method of solution should be
quite familiar to most graduate students in economics. Simply, ￿nd state contingent rules
for the policy variables, i("), f("), that maximize the expected value of the social welfare
25Strictly speaking, this is a second best solution. The ￿rst best obtains if the imperfections responsible
for the liquidity trap are removed. It is variously referred to as the ￿ precommitment solution￿ , the ￿ optimal
rational expectations solution￿ , the ￿ second best solution￿or simply the ￿ optimal solution￿ .
13(2.7) under the constraints (2.3), (2.4) and the rational expectations condition
￿
e = p￿￿ + (1 ￿ p)￿+.
Depending on the realization of the shock in the previous period, x, there are three pos-
sibilities. The economy could be (a) liquidity trapped in both the good ("+) and the bad
states ("￿), (b) not liquidity trapped in the good state but liquidity trapped in the bad
state, and (c) not liquidity trapped in either state. The main focus of this paper is on case
(b), although, for completeness, we consider all three cases.
Proposition 1 :(a) If x < ￿ps(￿+￿￿2)(￿’2+￿￿2)
￿￿(￿￿2+’2(￿+￿￿2)) then the economy is liquidity trapped in
both states and the commitment solution is given by i￿ = i+ = 0,
f￿ = ’
￿
(￿ + ￿￿2)s(1 ￿ p)


















￿￿(￿￿2+’2(￿+￿￿2)) ￿ x < (1 ￿ p) s
￿ then the economy is liquidity trapped in the
bad state only and the commitment solution is given by i￿ = f+ = 0,
f￿ =




















+ ￿￿￿2 (1 ￿ p)
￿ ￿ 0.
(c) If x ￿ (1 ￿ p) s
￿ then the economy is liquidity trapped in neither state and the com-
mitment solution is given by f￿ = f+ = 0,
i￿ =






> i￿ ￿ 0.
Proposition 1 illustrates the evolution of the economy over time. Suppose that the
economy is liquidity trapped in period t. How does it get out of a liquidity trap? Propo-
sition 1(b), (c), give the conditions required on how big the shocks must be in period t so
that in period t + 1 the economy is not liquidity trapped in at least in one state of the
world26.
26This might not be a bad descriptor of the actual occurrence of a liquidity trap given the deep reser-
vations expressed about the e¢ cacy of most macroeconomic policies; see Blinder (2000) for an excellent
survey.
14From Proposition 1(a), note that when the economy is liquidity trapped, monetary
policy is completely ine⁄ective in the good and the bad states, so i￿ = i+ = 0. Hence,
the government must commit to using expensive ￿scal policy in the two states, f￿ > 0,
f+ > 0, in order to ￿ lean against the wind￿ . By contrast, when the economy is liquidity
trapped in the bad state and not liquidity trapped in the good state (Proposition 1b) then
i￿ = f+ = 0. In this case, the costly ￿scal policy is not used outside a liquidity trap27,
while monetary policy is ine⁄ective in a liquidity trap. When the economy is not liquidity
trapped in either state (Proposition 1c) then there is no need at all to use the costly ￿scal
policy; monetary policy su¢ ces in both states.
It might be useful to consider the optimal rational expectations solution in a special
case to build more intuition. We formally de￿ne the special case.
De￿nition 1 : (Special Case) In this special case, (1) ￿ = ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 2 in the
society￿ s objective function (2.7), (2) ’ = ￿ = ￿ = 1 in the aggregate demand and supply
curves (2.1), (2.2) and (3) the noise term " takes two possible values ￿a, a with equal
probability, so ￿ = 0, p = 1=2, s = 2a, see section 2.2.
We state the result of this special case in Corollary 1. The proof can be found in DaN.
Corollary 1 : Consider the special case in De￿nition 1. The optimal state-contingent
rational expectations precommitment solution is given in Table 3.2. The expected utility in
Figure 3.2: The Precommitment solution in a special case

















Opt = 0 when ￿ = a.




Opt < 0 when ￿ = ￿a. Hence, the economy is always
liquidity trapped when ￿ = ￿a. In this case, monetary policy is not e⁄ective, i￿ = 0.
27Recall that f refers only to the stabilization component of ￿scal policy, hence, f+ = 0 is consistent
with a strictly positive level of government expenditure on other items such as redistribution etc.
15Hence, the government must commit to using the expensive ￿scal policy, f￿ = 2
5a, in order
to ￿ lean against the wind￿ . By contrast, when ￿ = a, monetary policy is e⁄ective, i+ = 6
5a,
and the government has no need for the expensive ￿scal instrument, f+ = 0.
Also note that output is below the natural rate (which is normalized to zero) in the
liquidity trap but above it otherwise. On average, it equals the natural rate (recall that
y measures the deviation of output from the natural rate). In￿ ation is positive in both
states of the world. The real interest rate is negative28 in the liquidity trap but positive
otherwise and on average.
Recall that in this special case, the shocks take the two possible values, ￿a and a and
V ar(￿) = a2. On average, ceteris paribus., in￿ ation, interest rates and the ￿scal instrument
of the government will display greater variability in economies where demand shocks have
a greater variance and precommitment is possible. Furthermore, the magnitude of policy
instruments employed in the two states of the world, f￿ = 2
5a and i+ = 6
5a, are increasing
in the size of the shock. This is not surprising as each of these policies ful￿lls a stabilization
role and a larger shock elicits a greater e⁄ort in ￿leaning against the wind￿ .
The solution is independent of y, society￿ s desired output relative to the natural rate.
As in time consistency models, in the absence of the liquidity trap, this occurs, because,
even if society has a high y, the precommitment technology allows it to counter expecta-
tions of ex-post surprise in￿ ation (designed to push output towards the high target).
The magnitude of social welfare in this regime depends negatively on the variance of
shocks hitting the economy, a2, and also on the output target of society, y.
Finally, note that the values of i+, i￿, f+, f￿ of the instruments are optimal ex-ante.
However, after the realization of the shock, " = ￿a or " = a, the ex-post optimal values
of i, f will, in general, be di⁄erent from these. Thus, for successful implementation, this
optimal rational expectations solution needs a precommitment technology.
Our focus is on the implementation of the rational precommitment solution by appro-
priate institutional design. So, we shall not dwell too much on the comparative statics
results.
4. Discretion
The full set of results under Discretion can be found in Appendix-B of Dhami and al-
Nowaihi (2007). Denote by EUDisc, the expected welfare level under discretion; we only
make use of it in one place, in Section 5.3, below.
28We conjecture that the combination of rigid wages-prices and a ￿ exible nominal interest rate has the
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Figure 5.1: Sequence of moves in the optimal delegation regime
5. Institutions and Delegation
We now ask if the precommitment rational expectations solution can be implemented by
an appropriate design of institutions. As outlined above, in Section 2.6, one could propose
several plausible models of the Treasury￿ s behavior. We now examine the possibility of
implementation in each of these alternative models.
5.1. The Optimal Delegation Regime: The baseline model
The preferences of the Treasury in the baseline model are described in section 2.6.1, above.














Note that the parameters ￿, ￿, ￿ are the same as in society￿ s welfare function given in
(2.7). We now consider the various subcases.
5.1.1. The in￿ ation targets of the Treasury and the Central Bank are distinct
Denote the optimal in￿ ation target of the Central Bank by ￿￿
B and the optimal output
and in￿ ation targets of the Treasury by y￿
T and ￿￿
T respectively.
Under optimal delegation, the game has ￿ve stages, shown in Figure 5.1. The Treasury
acts as the Stackelberg leader with an output target, yT, and an in￿ ation target ￿T. The
Central Bank is the follower with an in￿ ation target ￿B. The Central Bank sets monetary
policy, taking the ￿scal policy, set by the Treasury, as given. The Treasury sets ￿scal
policy, taking into account the anticipated response of the Central Bank.
We solve the game backwards. First we obtain the Central Bank￿ s reaction function
i = i(￿B;￿e;f;") by maximizing UB, given in (2.9). Second, we ￿nd the Treasury￿ s
reaction function f = f (yT;￿T;￿e;") by maximizing UT, given in (5.1). This allows us
17to derive output and in￿ ation as functions of yT;￿T;￿B;￿e;". Third, we determine ￿e,
assuming rational expectations on the part of the private sector. Fourth, we ￿nd the
expected social welfare, EUS, as a function of yT;￿T;￿B, which we maximize to ￿nd the




We assume that, in this baseline case, the Treasury and the Central Bank adopt their
respective optimal in￿ ation targets, ￿￿
T;￿￿
B, and that the Treasury fully complies with the
optimal output target, y￿
T. Section 5.2, below, explores the possibility that the Treasury
might not care for in￿ ation and/ or be unwilling to follow the optimal output target,
y￿
T, because it has its own output target, yT. For ease of reference, these concepts are
summarized in the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 2 : y is the output level preferred by society (0 is the in￿ ation level preferred
by society, see (2.7)). yT and ￿T are output and in￿ ation targets for the Treasury. ￿B
is the in￿ ation target for the Central Bank. y￿
T, ￿￿
T and ￿￿
B are the values of yT, ￿T and
￿B that maximize expected social welfare, EUS, subject to the constraints of the model,
where US is given by (2.7). In section 5.2, below, we allow the Treasury to adopt an output
target, yT, di⁄erent from y￿
T, consistent with its own agenda and also allow ￿T to di⁄er
from ￿B.
Proposition 2, below, states the results under optimal delegation. As in Proposition 1,
the magnitude of the demand shock in the previous period, x, gives rise to three subcases,
although we are primarily interested in Case (b).
Proposition 2 : (a) Under the condition of Proposition 1(a), give the Central Bank any
in￿ ation target, ￿￿








and give the Treasury
any output and in￿ ation target pair (yT;￿T) that satisfy




where k = ￿
(￿+￿)￿￿(￿x)
￿￿(￿’2+￿2￿). Then the solution under optimal delegation is the same as under
precommitment, and given by Proposition 1(a).










+ ￿￿2￿(1 ￿ p)
> 0; (5.3)
and give the Treasury any output and in￿ ation target pair (yT;￿T) that satis￿es








(￿+￿￿2)(￿’2+￿￿2p)+￿￿2￿(1￿p), is a constant that depends on the exogenous
parameters of the model. Then the solution under optimal delegation is the same as under
precommitment and is given by Proposition 1(b). Furthermore, in the good state, the
Central Bank hits it￿ s in￿ ation target i.e. ￿+ = ￿￿
B.
(c) Under the condition of Proposition 1(c), give the Central Bank the in￿ ation tar-
get ￿￿
B = 0. Then, for any output and in￿ ation target pair (yT;￿T) for the Treasury,
the solution under optimal delegation is the same as under commitment and is given by
Proposition 1(c). Furthermore, the Central Bank hits it￿ s in￿ ation target in the good and
the bad states i.e. ￿+ = ￿￿ = ￿￿
B = 0.
If the economy is not liquidity trapped in any state of the world, then, we are in the
standard textbook case where delegation to an independent Central Bank achieves the
precommitment solution. Proposition 2(c) deals with this case.
Our main case of interest, however, is when the economy is liquidity trapped in the
bad state only; this is stated in Proposition 2(b). Here, the in￿ ation target of the Central
Bank is uniquely determined while the Treasury￿ s target pair yT;￿T can be chosen from a
menu of contracts that satisfy (5.4). To explain the indeterminacy of yT and ￿T, in (5.4),
note that the Treasury has two targets, yT and ￿T, but just one instrument, f. Hence,
the best it can hope for is to hit just one of these targets or, more generally, a linear
combination of them. Maximizing society￿ s expected welfare yields the optimal linear
combination of yT and ￿T. This is given by (5.2) in the case of Proposition 2(a) and (5.4)
in the case of Proposition 2(b). The negative slope signi￿es that a high output bias is
needed to compensate a low in￿ ation target for the Treasury.
So why does the optimal delegation regime perform so well? The in￿ ation target given
to the Central Bank provides a commitment to the necessary in￿ ation level when the
economy is not in a liquidity trap. This a⁄ects the (ex-ante) in￿ ation expectations, which
also apply to the (ex-post) liquidity trap, ensuring the correct value for the real interest
rate in a liquidity trap. Furthermore, in￿ ationary expectations are also in￿ uenced correctly
by the output and in￿ ation targets given to the Treasury that provide it with the incentive
to use the appropriate level of ￿scal policy in a liquidity trap. Such an institutional regime
achieves the optimal balance between ￿scal and monetary policy by neither having to rely
too much on costly in￿ ation outside the liquidity trap, nor relying too much on costly
￿scal policy in a liquidity trap.
5.1.2. The in￿ ation targets of the Treasury and the Central Bank are identical
What if instead of ￿T 6= ￿B, the in￿ ation targets of the Treasury and the Central Bank
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Figure 5.2: Output and in￿ ation targets under the optimal and suboptimal
delegation regimes.
of the two cases. Corollary 2 describes the results when the economy is liquidity trapped
in the bad state only.
Corollary 2 : Under the conditions of Proposition 1(b), if the Treasury is also given the
same in￿ ation target as the Central Bank i.e. ￿T = ￿￿











+ ￿￿2￿(1 ￿ p)
> 0: (5.5)
then the Treasury attains this target in the good state i.e. y+ = y￿
T. Furthermore, the
solution under optimal delegation is the same as under precommitment and is given by
Proposition 1(b).
In Figure 5.2, the downward sloping line AA0 is a graph of yT (￿T) de￿ned in (5.2) or
(5.4). The vertical line positioned at ￿￿
B re￿ ects the in￿ ation target for the Central Bank
given in (5.3). Ignore the downward sloping line BB0 for the moment.
When the Treasury has baseline preferences, Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 show that
the optimal delegation regime can achieve the optimal precommitment solution in the fol-
lowing two cases,
201. The Treasury and the Central Bank can be given the same in￿ation target
Figure 5.2 shows that the optimal delegation solution is given by point C, where
￿B = ￿T = ￿￿
B (given in (5.3)) and yT = y￿
T (given in (5.5)).
2. The Treasury and the Central Bank are given distinct in￿ation targets
Figure 5.2 shows one possible menu of targets that achieves the optimal precommit-
ment solution. The Central Bank is given the uniquely determined in￿ ation target,
i.e., ￿B = ￿￿
B (see (5.3)). The Treasury is given any output, in￿ ation target along
the line AA, for instance, corresponding to point E, i.e., (yT;￿T) = (y1
T;￿1
T).
We also state, for future reference, the result in the special case when the conditions
in De￿nition 1 hold and the in￿ ation targets of the Treasury and the Central Bank are
identical.
Proposition 3 : Assume that the conditions in De￿nition 1 hold and the in￿ ation targets
of the Treasury and the Central Bank are identical. Monetary policy is delegated to
an independent Central Bank with in￿ ation target ￿￿
B = 3
5a. Fiscal policy is retained
by the Treasury with output target y￿
T = 1
5a. The Treasury acts as the Stackelberg
leader. Then, the optimal rational expectations (precommitment) solution (see Proposition








2y. The economy is liquidity trapped only in the bad state. In￿ ation
and output targets are achieved in the good state but not in the bad state.29 It follows that













achieve the optimal rational expectations solution.
(5.6) provides one example of what the expressions in (5.2), (5.4) look like, in the
special case of De￿nition 1.
5.2. What happens if the Treasury does not have an in￿ ation target?
Here we consider two alternative regimes. In both of these cases, the Central Bank is given
an in￿ ation target ￿B, i.e., has the objective function given in (2.9) but the Treasury is
not given an in￿ ation target. We consider the two cases when the Treasury is an output
nutter and a reckless output nutter, described in sections 2.6.2, 2.6.3. We ￿nd that these
regimes are able to achieve the precommitment solution.
29As stressed by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), failure to meet the in￿ ation target in the liquidity
trap does not signify failure of policy. A similar remark can be made with respect to the output target.
21Proposition 4 : Unless the economy is liquidity trapped in both states of the world,
if the Treasury can be assigned an optimal output target y￿
T and the Central Bank is
assigned an optimal in￿ ation target, ￿￿
B, then the outcome in the ￿output nutter￿and the
￿reckless output nutter￿cases is identical to the precommitment regime.
However, if the Treasury does not adopt the optimal output target, y￿
T, preferring
instead to follow it￿ s own agenda, captured in it￿ s private output target, yT, then the
outcome can be very poor, and much worse than the outcome under discretion, as we shall
see in section 5.3.
5.3. Suboptimal Delegation: Treasury follows its own agenda (yT 6= y￿
T )
We now consider the case where the Treasury does not adopt the optimal output target as
described in section 2.6.4 above. We call this regime ￿ suboptimal delegation￿ . The output
target yT now represents the Treasury￿ s own agenda and it refuses to accept the optimal
output target, y￿
T, assigned to it by society. The objective function of the Treasury is
given in (5.1). For pedagogical simplicity, we stick here to the more natural case where
the in￿ ation targets of the Treasury and the Central Bank are equal i.e. ￿B = ￿T.
Let ￿￿
B (yT) maximize society￿ s expected welfare, given the output target, yT, of the
Treasury. The expression for yT (￿￿
B) is too unwieldy, so consider the special case in
De￿nition 1 as our motivation device, for the moment.30 We know from Proposition 3,












In Figure 5.2, the line BB0 is a sketch of (the inverse of) ￿￿
B (yT). Any point on the line
BB0 gives the optimal in￿ ation target for the Central Bank, ￿￿
B (yT), conditional on the
Treasury￿ s private, but not necessarily optimal, output target, yT, which is steeper than
the schedule yT(￿T) plotted as line AA0.
Suppose that the Treasury￿ s output target is given by yT = y1
T. Then, at one possible
suboptimal equilibrium ￿B = ￿T = ￿2
T while yT = y1
T i.e. the Treasury￿ s target pair is
shown by the point D. Because point D is o⁄the line AA, which plots the optimal menu of
contracts for the Treasury, it is interesting to ask how well does the suboptimal delegation
regime fare, relative to the optimal precommitment solution? Simulations, below, show
that the performance of the suboptimal delegation regime, when the Treasury￿ s baseline
preferences are as in (5.1), is ￿ near optimal￿and much better than discretion.
30Recall that this implies that ￿ = ￿ = ￿ = 1; ’ = ￿ = ￿ = 1; ￿ = 0, p = 1=2, s = 2a.
225.3.1. Simulation results
While we have considered the special case of De￿nition 1 to graphically motivate the
problem above, here, we perform simulations for the completely general case. Denote the
expected social welfare level under suboptimal delegation by EUSD
S . The state contingent
values of the policy variables in this case run into several pages, so we con￿ne ourselves





S is the expected welfare level under the optimal solution relative to
the expected welfare under suboptimal delegation. Note that 0 < q ￿ 1 and q = 1 when
yT = y￿
T (see Proposition 2).
! = EUDisc
S =EUSD
S is the ratio of the expected welfare under discretion relative to that










is the ratio of the welfare loss under suboptimal delegation relative
to that under the optimal solution when each is expressed as a di⁄erence from the ex-
pected welfare level under discretion. Hence, relative to the discretionary solution as a
benchmark, this is the proportional loss to society in moving from the optimal solution to
the suboptimal delegation solution. Note that Q = 1 for yT = y￿
T (see Proposition 2).
o = y=y￿
T is the output target of society relative to the optimal output target given to
the Treasury.
t = yT=y￿
T is the output target of the Treasury relative to the optimal output target
given to it.
The feasible set of parameters belongs to a ten dimensional set. We give below simula-
tions for a representative sample of parameters in Tables 1, 2 below. Tables 4 through 6 in
Appendix-C of Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) give further simulation results to support our
assertions. To simplify results, we focus on cases where the output targets of the Treasury
and society coincide i.e. yT = y (and so o = t) and the in￿ ation targets of the Treasury
and the Central Bank also coincide i.e. ￿T = ￿B.
The main results of the simulations can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 5 : Even if the private agenda of the Treasury, i.e. yT, is substantially dif-
ferent from the optimal output target, y￿
T, the expected welfare level under the suboptimal
delegation solution is very close to the optimal precommitment solution i.e. q is very close
to 1. Suppose that we start with the minimal institutional framework of the discretionary
regime. Then, moving to the institutional regime of suboptimal delegation recovers, for
all parameter values that we have investigated, a very large percentage of the bene￿t that
might accrue if one could move to the optimal solution, i.e., Q is typically very close to 1.
23Table 1: p = 1
2;yT = y = s;x = 0

































































































10 0:9873 1:039 0:7521 2:84 0:371s
In Table 1, the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state only. Even if the output
target of the Treasury is up to 602:2 times higher than the optimal output target (i.e.
o = t = 602:2), q and Q are still very close to 1. Tables 4-6, in Dhami and al-Nowaihi
(2007), con￿rm these results for other parameter values. In Table 2, below, constructed
under the conditions of Proposition 2(a), the economy is liquidity trapped in both states
and there is a very high level of persistence in the demand shocks.
Table 2: p = 1
50;yT = y = ps;x = ￿(1 ￿ p)s;￿ = 9
10


























































From Table 2, the social loss in the discretionary regime is, in some cases, twice that
under suboptimal delegation.
Table 3 gives a sample of results for the ￿output nutter￿case, when the Treasury does
not follow the output target, y￿
T, assigned to it by society. Unlike the suboptimal delegation
case discussed above, the outcome here can be very bad, even worse than discretion.
Table 3: Treasury is an ￿output nutter￿(p = 1
50;yT = y = s 6= y￿
T;x = 0)

















































In this case, Q can take extreme negative values i.e. the output nutter regime turns
out to be much worse than discretion; we summarize this result in the Proposition below.
24Proposition 6 : If the Treasury is not assigned the optimal output target, y￿
T, then the
performance of the ￿output nutter￿and the ￿reckless output nutter￿regimes can be very
adverse and, possibly, much worse than the discretionary regime. In particular, if monetary
policy is delegated to an independent central bank, with an optimal in￿ ation target, while
the Treasury retains discretion over ￿scal policy, then the outcome can be poor and much
worse than had the Treasury retained discretion over both monetary and ￿scal policy.
Proposition 6 indicates the serious consequences that can arise if the Treasury/government
does not have the appropriate in￿ ation or output targets even if it follows society￿ s most
preferred output target (note yT = y in Table 3).
5.4. Summary
Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 establish that the optimal delegation regime (where the Bank
has an optimal in￿ ation target and the Treasury has optimal output and in￿ ation targets)
achieves the precommitment solution for all parameter values. Proposition 5 shows that
performance of the suboptimal delegation regime (similar to the optimal delegation regime,
except that the Treasury has its own output target) is near optimal, and much better
than discretion, even when the Treasury deviates considerably from the optimal output
target. Proposition 4 establishes that the output nutter and the reckless output nutter
regimes (in both cases, the Bank and Treasury are given optimal in￿ ation and output
targets, respectively, but the Treasury is not given an in￿ ation target) also achieve the
precommitment solution. However, Proposition 6 shows that the latter two regimes, unlike
the suboptimal delegation regime, perform poorly, and can be much worse than discretion,
if the Treasury deviates from the optimal output target.
Thus, although giving the Treasury an in￿ ation target as well as an output target
is not necessary for optimality, it is necessary to achieve robustness. In particular, a
hybrid system, where monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank with
an in￿ ation target, but where the Treasury retains discretion over ￿scal policy, can perform
poorly and much worse than had the Treasury retained discretion over both monetary and
￿scal policy.
6. Conclusions
The role of ￿scal policy in theoretical models of the liquidity trap has not been adequately
stressed despite this being Keynes￿ s (1936) original solution to the problem. This is puz-
zling in light of the empirical evidence from Posen (1998), Kuttner and Posen (2001) which
suggests that ￿scal policy, when used in Japan, has been potent. The simulation exercises
of Ball (2005) show that ￿scal transfers equal to 6.6 percent of GDP could have ended
25Japan￿ s output slump. There have been other suggestions in the literature, without a full
theoretical model, that advocate ￿scal policy in a liquidity trap. Bernanke (2002) rec-
ommends a broad based tax cut while Gertler (2003) recommends transitory ￿scal policy.
We consider ￿scal policy and monetary policy, explicitly, in a Dixit and Lambertini (2003)
framework when there is the possibility of a liquidity trap.
The theoretical literature has considered aspects of our optimal delegation regime, that
achieves the precommitment solution. For instance, in￿ ation targets have been suggested
in Krugman (1998), Nishiyama (2003), and Iwamura et al. (2005). Other variants of
monetary policy commitment have also been considered. Benhabib Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2002) consider a commitment to switch from an interest rate rule to a money growth
rate peg in a liquidity trap. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) propose a commitment to
adjust nominal interest rates to achieve a time varying price level target. Bernanke (2002)
suggests a commitment to a bu⁄er zone for the in￿ ation rate. Svensson (2003) advocates
a price level target (as part of a larger set of policies). However, none of these models
allow for the possibility of strategic interaction between monetary and ￿scal authorities
nor jointly derive the optimal set of targets and instruments of the two policy making
authorities.
Eggertsson (2006a, 2006b) studies the liquidity trap within a new Keynesian stochastic
general equilibrium model with a government budget constraint and explicit microfounda-
tions. Eggertsson recommends abandonment of an independent central bank and a return
to discretionary policy by a unitary monetary-￿scal authority. A debt ￿nanced ￿scal ex-
pansion during a liquidity trap results, via the government budget constraint, in higher
expectations of future in￿ ation. Eggertsson shows that this solution is superior to either
monetary policy alone or uncoordinated monetary and ￿scal policy. However, as Eggerts-
son shows, even optimal discretion is inferior to the fully optimal rational expectations
solution with commitment. Moreover, abandoning delegation of monetary policy to an in-
dependent central bank with a narrow mandate, in favor of a return to discretion, appears
to be a retrograde step.
Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) consider strategic
interaction between ￿scal and monetary authorities, but in the absence of a liquidity trap.
Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) show that the equilibrium with the ￿scal authority acting
as leader is superior to the Nash equilibrium. Dixit and Lambertini (2003) show that this
regime can achieve the optimal precommitment rational expectations solution.
One of the important lessons of our paper is that an optimally derived target for one
policy maker that ignores the incentives and constraints facing the other policy maker can
lead to extremely poor outcomes; see Proposition 6. The intuition is that if there were
26no liquidity trap, and the Treasury had its own agenda31, then it would undermine the
Central Bank￿ s monetary commitment. However, appropriate delegation of policy to the
Treasury, far from undermining monetary commitment, gives it an incentive to engage in
an ￿ appropriate￿￿scal stimulus in a liquidity trap, where the independent Central Bank is
ine⁄ective. This is in line with the case when there is no liquidity trap considered by Dixit
and Lambertini (2003, p1523, point 4): ￿Commitment achieves the second best only if it
can be extended to both monetary and ￿scal policy￿ .
Furthermore, the optimal delegation regime achieves the optimal mix between mone-
tary and ￿scal policy as we now explain. Theoretically, society could give a su¢ ciently
high in￿ ation target to the Central Bank which in turn generates su¢ ciently high in￿ ation
expectations so that the nominal interest rate never hits its zero ￿ oor. While this policy
would always avoid the liquidity trap, it is not optimal because in￿ ation is costly. Analo-
gously it is not optimal to give the Treasury too high an output target because if a liquidity
trap occurs, it would use the costly ￿scal policy excessively. The optimal solution then is
to have a mix of both i.e. some in￿ ation outside a liquidity trap and some dependence on
costly ￿scal policy in a liquidity trap.
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